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Abstract 
Malicious content in spam emails is increasing in the 
forms of attachments and URLs. Malicious attachments 
and URLs both attempt to deliver software that 
compromises the security of a computer. Malicious 
attachments try to disguise their content, but many email 
services offer virus scanners. Malicious URLs add 
another layer of disguise, where the email content tries to 
coerce the recipient to click a URL linking to a malicious 
Web site or download a malicious attachment. In this 
paper, we present our initial work in predicting spam 
emails containing these highly dangerous spam emails 
from two real world data sets. We propose a rich set of 
novel features for the content of emails to capture 
regularities in emails containing malicious content. We 
show these features can predict malicious attachments 
with an area under the precious recall curve (AUC-PR) up 
to 95.24%, and up to 68.09% for URLs. Our work reduces 
the need for virus scanners and URL blacklists, which 
often do not update as quickly as malicious content 
appears and requires many different resources to identify 
malicious content. 
Keywords:  Email, Spam, Malicious, Attachment, URL, 
Machine Learning. 
1 Introduction 
Email spam, unsolicited bulk email (Blanzieri & Bryl, 
2008), accounts for an average of 66.5% of all emails sent 
in the first quarter of 2013, where 3.3% of all emails 
contained malicious attachments1. Estimates show that 
approximately 183 billion emails (6 billion emails with 
malicious attachments) are sent every day in the first 
quarter of 20132. Malicious attachments and URLs 
(Universal Resource Locators – also known as Web links) 
are attempts to infect the computer of a recipient with 
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malware (malicious software) such as viruses, trojans, 
and keyloggers. Malicious attachments in emails are a 
direct delivery method for malware, whereas malicious 
URLs are indirect. These spam emails with malicious 
content (attachments or URLs) try to coerce the recipient 
into opening attachments or click on URLs. These spam 
emails have subject and content text that entices or alarms 
the recipient to act on the malicious content. 
To find this type of dangerous spam emails, scanning 
the attachments of emails and URLs with virus scanners 
or against blacklists often reveals their malicious content. 
However, scanning emails require external resources that 
are often computationally expensive and difficult to 
maintain (Ma, Saul, Savage, & Voelker, Identifying 
Suspicious URLs: An Application of Large-Scale Online 
Learning, 2009). This method of identifying spam and 
other spam filtering methods often aim to be more 
reactive to changes in spamming techniques than 
spammers, and are not robust to handle variations in spam 
emails (Blanzieri & Bryl, 2008). 
The task of identifying malicious content (attachments 
or URLs) in spam emails is not well studied, as far as we 
are aware. Our specific definition of malicious to include 
only malware differentiates from research in classifying 
phishing emails by analysing URLs in their content. This 
task is important as it identifies one of the most harmful 
types of spam emails for recipients. 
In this initial work, we propose novel features for 
predicting malicious attachments and URLs in spam 
emails. We hypothesise that spam emails with malicious 
attachments or URLs can be predicted only from the text 
content in the email subject and body. Our work differs 
from related work as it is self-contained (do not require 
external resources) and do not add risks of exposure to 
malicious content by analysing or scanning attachments, 
or by following URLs. We use two real world data sets 
obtained from two different sources. The first data set is 
from the Habul plugin for the Thunderbird mail client, 
and the second data set, Botnet, is collected from 
honeypots around the world to study the characteristics of 
email spam botnets. 
We extract many features from metadata and text 
content of these real world spam emails. These proposed 
features are: self-contained (no need to scan emails using 
external resources such as virus scanners and blacklists); 
robust (high adaptability to changes in spamming 
techniques); and time efficient (process many emails per 
second). We apply a Random Forest classifier on these 
features to show their effectiveness in distinguishing 
spam emails with and without malicious attachments. 
However, our features are insufficient to classify spam 
emails with and without malicious URLs. We discuss 
reasons for success and failure of our features and 
potential research directions from this initial work. 
Our contributions in this initial work are (1) 
developing novel features that do not require external 
resources for the task of classifying malicious spam 
emails, (2) evaluating these features on two real-world 
data sets, and (3) demonstrating malicious attachments 
can be predicted from only the email itself with high 
classification scores. Our work reduces the need to scan 
emails for malicious content, saving time and resources. 
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 
2 summarises related work. Section 3 explains the 
structure and content of malicious spam emails, and 
Section 4 details our real world data sets. Section 5 
presents our proposed features to capture malicious intent 
in these emails. Section 6 details our evaluation 
methodology and Section 7 summarises our results. We 
discuss our results in Section 8 and conclude our findings 
in this initial work in Section 9. 
2 Related Work 
We summarise related work in four aspects of our work, 
highlighting text and machine learning based approaches. 
We look at spam filtering and related work specifically 
on classifying malicious attachments and URLs. From a 
related field of Wikipedia vandalism detection, we 
borrow some features and adapt them to our problem. 
2.1 Email Spam Filtering 
Spam filtering is a well-developed field with many 
techniques for many types of spam (Blanzieri & Bryl, 
2008). A survey of machine learning based approaches to 
spam filtering by Blanzieri & Bryl (2008) covers the 
ambigious definitions of spam, summarises a variety of 
spam detection methods and their applicability to 
different parts of an email, and summarises the various 
data sets used in research. The survey shows a variety of 
machine learning approaches that rely on features 
extracted from the email header, body, and the whole 
email message. 
In summary, email spam filtering is a mature research 
field with many filtering techniques such as rule based, 
information retrieval based, machine learning based, 
graph based, and hybrid techniques. However, identifying 
emails with malicious content is a problem within this 
research area that has not been well investigated. 
2.2 Classification of Malicious Attachments 
Emails containing malicious attachments are one the most 
dangerous types of emails as its malware has the potential 
to do significant damage to computers and to spread 
rapidly. The email usage behaviour can change depending 
on the malware’s intent on spreading infection. By 
engineering features that capture behavioural properties 
of email usage and emails, the outgoing email behaviour 
of users can predict when malware has compromised a 
computer (Martin, Nelson, Sewani, Chen, & Joseph, 
2005). Applying feature reduction techniques can further 
improve classification accuracy of malware propagating 
in outgoing mail (Masud, Khan, & Thuraisingham, 2007). 
These approaches aim to identify new malware by 
behaviour after infection. 
For preventative solutions without needing to scan 
attachments, analysing properties of the software 
executables can reveal malicious intent (Wang, Yu, 
Champion, Fu, & Xuan, 2007). Our work also aims to be 
preventative, but without adding the risk of infection by 
analysing software executables. 
2.3 Classification of Malicious URLs 
Research on classifying URLs for malicious intent extend 
beyond spam emails, because of the common nature of 
URLs in many Web documents and communications. 
Blacklisting is a highly efficient method of preventing 
access to malicious URLs, but it relies on knowing those 
URLs are malicious beforehand (Ma, Saul, Savage, & 
Voelker, Learning to Detect Malicious URLs, 2011). 
Furthermore, blacklisting services cannot keep up with 
spamming bots operating at various URLs and IP 
addresses (Ramachandran, Dagon, & Feamster, 2006). 
To be effective and adaptive to new malicious URLs, 
engineering URL features based on text and hosting 
properties for classifiers has shown to be successful (Ma, 
Saul, Savage, & Voelker, Beyond Blacklists: Learning to 
Detect Malicious Web Sites from Suspicious URLs, 
2009) (Le, Markopoulou, & Faloutsos, 2011). However, 
these features require many external resources such as IP 
blacklists, domain registration details, DNS records, and 
geographical location of IP addresses. Although they can 
be applied in real-time classification of URLs, there are 
trade-offs in accuracy and processing quantity (Ma, Saul, 
Savage, & Voelker, Identifying Suspicious URLs: An 
Application of Large-Scale Online Learning, 2009). 
Other methods of detecting malicious URLs require 
accessing the Web pages of URLs and performing further 
analysis. Parts of Web pages can be obfuscated to hide 
malicious intent, such as malicious Javascript code 
(Likarish, Jung, & Jo, 2009). However, developing many 
feature sets over the structure and content of provides a 
comprehensive analysis of the malicious nature of Web 
pages (Canali, Cova, Vigna, & Kruegel, 2011). 
2.4 Wikipedia Vandalism Detection 
In this initial work, we borrow some text features from a 
related field of vandalism detection on Wikipedia. The 
problem of vandalism (a malicious edit) detection and 
detecting emails with malicious content have similar 
characteristics. In both cases, the text within a Wikipedia 
article and text in an email may contain content that 
distinguishes it from a normal article or normal (spam) 
email, respectively. For example, abnormal use of vulgar 
words or excessive uppercase words may hint at 
malicious intent. Our initial work provides a pathway to 
share classification models between these two research 
areas to address the problem of insufficient training 
samples for classification models. 
The PAN Workshops in 2010 and 2011 held 
competitions for vandalism detection in Wikipedia, where 
they released a data set containing manually classified 
cases of vandalism. In Section 7, we describe our selected 
text features from the winners of the competitions in 2010 
(Velasco, 2010) and 2011 (West & Lee, 2011). These text 
features aim to show text regularities within spam emails. 
3 Malicious Spam Emails 
Spam emails vary from annoying, but harmless, 
advertising to dangerous scams, fraudulent activity, and 
enabling cybercrime. Spam emails with malware or URLs 
directing to malware are cybercriminals looking to find 
new victims. For example, spammers may be wanting to 
expand their botnets or cybercriminals may be looking to 
propagate their computer viruses to harvest passwords, 
credit cards, bank accounts, and other sensitive personal 
information. Our work aims to be a preventative method 
to stop the propagation of malware using spam emails. 
Before presenting our results, we briefly describe our raw 
data of malicious spam emails and how cybercriminals 
send spam emails. 
Emails are well-known to many people, but not the 
raw email data where we construct our features. We 
present an example of a (fake) spam email with potential 
malicious content in Figure 1, stripped of irrelevant 
metadata. The figure shows an email in raw text format 
with annotations showing important parts of the email for 
feature construction. We have the email header that 
contains delivery instructions for mail servers, and the 
email body that can have many sections for text, 
attachments, and other types of attachable data. Emails 
are identified as spam in two ways: a human determines 
an email is spam, and emails collected from known 
spamming networks. Both scenarios of determining spam 
are captured in our two real world data sets. 
Our example in Figure 1 shows a typical structure of a 
malicious spam email. The subject or text content of 
malicious spam emails often contains social engineering 
methods to manipulate recipients into reading or acting 
on the email. In this case, we have the premise of a fake 
undelivered parcel requiring the recipient to download a 
compressed file (purposefully misleading with multiple 
file extensions). This compressed file serves the purpose 
of hiding malware executables, and hiding its malware 
from virus scanners operating at mail servers. The URL 
in this example acts as a secondary method of delivering 
malicious content. Similar to attachments, malicious 
URLs can disguise its true malicious Web site (e.g. 
example.com) by adding subdomains representing a 
known Web site (e.g. tracking.yourpostoffice). Our 
example also shows a possible spam template, where 
attachments or URLs may have different names, but the 
same malicious intent. 
Spam templates are often used in spam campaigns, 
where many emails are sent in a short period of time with 
lexical variations to their content (Stone-Gross, Holz, 
Stringhini, & Vigna, 2011). In our example in Figure 1, 
variations can occur in the tracking number, attachment 
name, and URL. These variations are attempts to prevent 
basic spam detection methods by mail servers. Other 
obfuscation methods include manipulation of email 
headers to include legitimate email addresses to avoid 
spam filtering and allowing more spam emails to be sent. 
The emergence and proliferation of botnets have 
allowed large quantities of spam emails to be sent in a 
coordinated way, and amplify cybercrime activities 
(Broadhurst, et al., 2013). Botnets are networks of 
compromised computers controlled by a person, named as 
the botmaster. Botnets are the backbone of spam delivery, 
where estimates suggest approximately 85% of the 
world’s spam email are sent by botnets each day (John, 
Moshchuk, Gribble, & Krishnamurthy, 2009). The use of 
botnets show how spammers understand and manipulate 
the networks of compromised computers and servers 
around the world to ensure high volumes of spam are 
delivered to many people. 
Overall, the use of spam emails to propagate malware 
is an important problem as the social engineering in spam 
emails provides a direct infection method to recipients. 
From: abc@example.com 
To: b1@example.com; b2@example.com 
Date: Sun, 01 Jan 2013  01:23:45 +0100 
MIME-Version: 1.0 
Content-Type: multipart/mixed; 
Subject: Track your parcel #12345 
 
------=_NextPart_001 
Content-Type: text/plain; 
        charset="iso-8859-1" 
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable 
 
You have an undelivered parcel! 
 
Please follow the instructions attached to find your 
parcel here: http://tracking.yourpostoffice.example.com 
 
------=_NextPart_000 
Content-Type: application/x-zip-compressed; 
        name="tracking_instructions.zip" 
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 
Content-Disposition: attachment; 
        filename="tracking_instructions.pdf.zip" 
 
(base64 string of attachment) 
Email Header  
Email Body  
Attachment 
Seemingly 
harmless URL, 
which can also 
be redirects or 
compromised 
Web sites.  
Malicious attachments 
may be hidden in these 
compressed files. 
Notice the multiple 
file extensions. 
Social engineering 
to entice or coerce 
recipients to act.  
Spam emails are often 
send in large quantities 
and at certain times for 
spam campaigns. 
Text content 
Figure 1: An example (fake) spam email with a potential malicious attachment and URL. 
4 Email Spam Data Sets 
We use two real world data sets from two different spam 
collection sources. The first comes from the Habul Plugin 
for Thunderbird (an offline mail client) that uses an 
adaptive filter to learn from a user's labelling of spam and 
normal email. Table 3 summarizes the statistics of the 
Habul data set, which are compiled monthly. The second 
data set is compiled from a global system of spam traps 
designed to monitor information about spam and other 
malicious activities. We name the second data set as 
Botnet. Table 2 summarizes the statistics of Botnet data 
set, which are also compiled monthly. We receive both 
data sets in anonymised form, so no identifiable email 
addresses or IPs are available for analysis. 
For each email, we extract attachments and URLs and 
upload to VirusTotal3, a free online virus checker that 
offers support for academic researchers, to scan for 
viruses and suspicious content. VirusTotal uses over 40 
different virus scanners, where we consider an attachment 
or URL to be malicious if at least one scanner shows a 
positive result. For this initial study, we only focus on 
emails with attachments or URLs to predict emails with 
malicious content. 
The Habul data set is relatively smaller than the Botnet 
data set, but has the advantage of emails being manually 
labelled as spam. This means spam in the Habul data set 
has reached its recipient and has been viewed. The Botnet 
data set contains spam that circulates the world, but 
without certainty that the emails have reached their 
intended targets. 
Both data sets show some similarities, such as nearly 
half of spam emails contain at least one URL, but only a 
low percentage are malicious. In contrast, many more 
emails with attachments are malicious. For each data set, 
there are peaks of spam with and without malicious 
content, which suggests different types of spam 
campaigns. These campaigns usually have shared 
similarities in the content of their emails, which may 
indicate malicious content without needing to scan. 
5 Feature Engineering 
In this initial work, we explore a comprehensive set of 
features for email content. We borrow some of these 
features from a related field of vandalism detection on 
Wikipedia, where the aim is to identify malicious 
modifications to articles. In particular, we borrow some 
text features from the winners of vandalism competitions 
held at the PAN Workshops in 2010 and 2011 (Velasco, 
2010) (West & Lee, 2011). As far as we are aware, none 
of the features described below have been used to predict 
malicious content in emails. We describe their novelty in 
the context of their applications in other areas of research. 
5.1 Feature Description 
Table 3 shows our features and a summary description. 
Features with prefix H are email header features; prefix S 
are subject features; prefix P are payload features (or 
content of email); prefix A are features of attachments; 
and prefix U are features of URLs. We describe these 
features in detail below in these groups of relatedness. 
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5.1.1 Header Features 
Features H01 to H04 are simple time features that 
captures when emails were sent. The times of emails have 
been normalised to Greenwich Median Time (GMT) to 
account for emails being sent from different servers 
around the world. Emails from spam campaign are often 
sent at the same time in mass quantities. 
Features H05 and H06 are counts of the email 
addresses of the sender and intended recipients. Since 
these features have been anonymised, we only count the 
number of addresses. We intend on expanding analysis on 
these anonymised email addresses in future work for 
features such as targeted spam campaigns. 
5.1.2 Text Features 
These features are applied to the subject (prefix S) and 
payload (prefix P) of emails. Although we apply calculate 
these features identically on different data, they have 
some differences in meaning for subject and payload 
data. For text in the subject and payload, we extract a list 
of words and the count of appearance of each word. 
 Feature S01 (P01) is a simple count of the number of 
characters in the text of the subject or payload. 
Features S02 to S04 (P02 tp P04) are a count of 
special words in emails. We obtain lists of these words 
Habul 
with 
Attachments 
with URLs 
Month Emails Total Mal. Total Mal. 
Jan 67 7 3 25 3 
Feb 104 10 2 33 6 
Mar 75 5 0 28 4 
Apr 65 4 2 26 2 
May 83 4 0 38 5 
Jun 94 1 0 41 5 
Jul 72 2 1 26 11 
Aug 85 0 0 46 10 
Sep 363 11 7 140 4 
Oct 73 1 1 11 3 
Nov 193 4 0 89 13 
Dec 95 6 3 31 12 
Total 1,369 55 19 534 78 
 
Table 1: Habul Data Set Statistics 
 
 
Botnet with Attachments with URLs 
Month Emails Total Mal. Total Mal. 
Jan 31,991 139 27 12,480 4 
Feb 49,085 528 66 14,748 4 
Mar 45,413 540 52 19,895 23 
Apr 33,311 328 175 12,339 0 
May 28,415 753 592 13,645 3 
Jun 11,587 102 56 8,052 80 
Jul 16,251 425 196 5,615 92 
Aug 21,970 291 113 16,970 707 
Sep 27,819 282 12 17,924 442 
Oct 13,426 899 524 4,949 2 
Nov 17,145 1,107 882 7,877 49 
Dec 20,696 621 313 7,992 241 
Total 317,109 6,015 3,008 142,486 1,647 
 
Table 2: Botnet Data Set Statistics 
from Wiktionary4 for English. This gives 27 unique 
pronoun words, 1064 unique vulgar words, and 5,980 
unique slang words. These features are strong indicators 
of spam emails and possibly malicious content as the 
email payload attempts to persuade users to download 
files or follow URLs. These features are borrowed from 
the PAN Workshops (Velasco, 2010) (West & Lee, 
2011), but using different sources for these words. 
Features S05 to S12 (P05 to P12) are also borrowed 
from the PAN Workshops (Velasco, 2010) (West & Lee, 
2011). These features are self descriptive and look for 
patterns in the words used in the subject and payload of 
emails. We expect these features to distinguish emails 
from spam campaigns as these campaigns often use email 
templates (Kreibich, et al., 2009). 
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Features S13 to S23 (P13 to P23) are our set of novel 
proposed features. These features look closer at the 
distribution of character types in the form of ratios. We 
select out the maximum and minimum of each features 
applied to each word to highlight unique oddities in the 
words used in the email subject and payload. We give 
definitions of some less self-descriptive features: 
- Character diversity is a concept borrowed from 
Velasco (2010). We interperet it here as a measure of 
different characters in a word compared to the word 
length: 𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ
1
𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠 
- Compression ratio is defined as: 
𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒
𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒
 
In the subject of spam emails, these emphasise unique 
words much stronger than features S02 to S12, because of 
the relatively shorter length of text to the payload. 
Features S18 to S21 are variants of the same concept 
of identifying words with repeating characters. We use 
these features to account for simple misspellings of words 
by repeating characters. These are the most 
computationally intensive features, with feature S19 
taking on average 4ms per email, and features S18, S20, 
and S21 taking on average less than 1ms. All other 
features take on average between 0.0050ms and 
0.0100ms per email. Note that these are timings to 
generate a single feature and does not include 
parallelisation and batch pre-processing of required data. 
5.1.3 Attachment Features 
These features (prefix A) are specific to spam emails with 
attachments. We do not use URL features with these 
attachment features. Our initial investigation only looks at 
simple, but novel, features of how attachments appear in 
emails. In particular, we count the number of files and the 
declared content types (such as image or zip files). For 
spam emails with attachments, malicious attachments 
may appear as the only attachment in emails, or attempt 
to hide in many different types of attachments. In future 
work, we look to generate more features from filenames 
or other attributes of attachments to avoid needing to scan 
for malicious content. 
5.1.4 URL Features 
These features (prefix U) are specific to spam emails with 
attachments. We do not use these features with the 
attachment features. These few features are novel in this 
classification task. In future work, we will look to apply 
more complex text analysis specifically for URLs to 
extract features that may distinguish URLs that direct to 
websites with and without malicious content. For 
example, the number of URLs with common domain 
names or common access pages. 
5.2 Feature Ranking 
With many varieties of features, we find features 
important to our classification task and compare across 
different data sets. The Random Forest classifier produces 
a ranking of these features based on their entropy scores 
(Pedregosa, et al., 2011). Please see Section 7. for a 
description of our classifier and classification results. 
Feature Description 
H01-DAY Day of week when email was sent. 
H02-HOUR Hour of day when email was sent. 
H03-MIN Minute of hour when email was sent. 
H04-SEC Second of minute when email was sent. 
H05-FROM 
Number of “from” email addresses, known as 
email senders. 
H06-TO 
Number of “to” email addresses, known as 
email recipients. 
S01-LEN Number of characters. 
S02-PW Number of pronoun words. 
S03-VW Number of vulgar words. 
S04-SW Number of slang words. 
S05-CW Number of capitalised words. 
S06-UW Number of words in all uppercase. 
S07-DW Number of words that are digits. 
S08-LW Number of words containing only letters. 
S09-LNW 
Number of words containing letters and 
numbers. 
S10-SL Number of words that are single letters. 
S11-SD Number of words that are single digits. 
S12-SC Number of words that are single characters. 
S13-UL 
Max ratio of uppercase letters to lowercase 
letters of each word. 
S14-UA 
Max of ratio of uppercase letters to all 
characters of each word. 
S15-DA 
Max of ratio of digit characters to all characters 
of each word. 
S16-NAA 
Max of ratio of non-alphanumeric characters to 
all characters of each word. 
S17-CD Min of character diversity of each word. 
S18-LRC Max of the longest repeating character. 
S19-LZW 
Min of the compression ratio for the lzw 
compressor. 
S20-ZLIB 
Min of the compression ratio for the zlib 
compressor. 
S21-BZ2 
Min of the compression ratio for the bz2 
compressor. 
S22-CL Max of the character lengths of words. 
S23-SCL Sum of all the character lengths of words. 
P01 to P12, 
P13 to P23 
Same as features S01 to S23, but for the email 
payload (content). 
A01-UFILES Number of unique attachment files in an email. 
A02-NFILES Number of all attachment files in an email. 
A03-UCONT Number of unique content types of attachment 
files in an email. 
A04-NCONT Number of all content types of attachment files 
in an email. 
U01-UURLS The number of unique URLs in an email. 
U02-NURLS The number of all URLs in an email. 
Table 3: Email Features. Features in bold text are 
novel features not seen in other research areas. 
The entropy scores measure the information gained when 
splitting a decision tree (in the forest) on that feature. The 
aim is to have the most homogenous decision branches 
after a split, which improves classification results. For 
example, for emails with attachments in the Botnet data 
set, we gain more than twice as much information by 
splitting on feature S21 (0.1066) than on feature S22 
(0.0451). To account for randomness in the Random 
Forest classifier, we present the average scores of 10 
training iterations in Table 4 for the data split of 
November (details in Section 7). We bold features that 
are our novel contributions. 
From Table 4, we see the majority of the top features 
are our proposed features for this classification task. In 
particular, for the larger Botnet data set with many email 
samples, we find our features perform consistently well. 
The variety of features show no feature dominates as a 
top 5 performer across data sets, and attachments and 
URLs. This further emphasise the need for a feature rich 
model to capture variations in different types of spam 
emails containing malicious content. 
For the Habul data set, predicting malicious 
attachments and URLs from email content shows 
different important features. For attachments, we find 
features S05, S23, S09, and S15, all suggesting emails 
with capitalised words containing letters and digits in the 
subject line. This formality in the subject line attempts to 
gain the trust of recipients to open the email and 
download the attachments. The presence of feature H02 
suggests these malicious spam email may be originating 
from spam campaigns. For URLs, we find URL and 
payload features. Features U02 and U01 appearing 
together suggests a few unique URLs. This suggests 
malicious spam emails contain few URLs with content to 
persuade recipients to click on those URLs. 
For the Botnet data set, we find the subject of the 
email to be the strongest predictor of malicious 
attachments, whereas when the email was sent to be a 
good predictor of malicious URLs. For attachments, we 
have the email subject having low compressibility of 
words for all three compression algorithms (S21, S20, 
and S19), many different characters (S17), and long 
words (S22). This suggests subject lines with seemingly 
random characters, which may trigger curiosity from the 
recipient to download the malicious attachments within 
the email. For URLs, the time features are highly 
predictive along with the length of the content of the 
email. This suggests spam campaigns with email 
templates of with strange subject text to induce the 
curiosity of recipients to download attachments. 
For the two different data sets, we find similarities in 
the features that are predictive for predicting malicious 
attachments and URLs. Emails with attachments indicate 
their malicious intent mainly in their subject line. For 
emails with URLs, the malicious intent is seen in the 
number of URLs, the text, and when the emails were sent. 
6 Evaluation Methodology 
As our data sets are already partitioned into months, we 
combine the data sets by months, learn on the earlier 
months and test our classifier on the later months. Figure 
2 illustrates our data splitting process into training and 
testing data sets for months Jul and Nov. For example, for 
the month of Jul, we train on all spam emails with 
malicious content from Jan to Jul, and test on spam 
emails with attachments or URLs from Aug to Dec. This 
shows the effects of different training sample size on 
classification quality, and adaptability of classifiers. 
We combine the feature sets differently for 
classification of attachments and URLs. For attachments, 
we choose features with the prefixes of H, S, P, and A. 
For URLs, we choose with prefixes of H, S, P, and U. 
We use three classifiers to evaluate our features: Naïve 
Bayes (NB), Random Forest (RF), and Support Vector 
Machine (SVM); and evaluation metrics from the Scikit-
learn toolkit (Pedregosa, et al., 2011). The NB and SVM 
classifiers are commonly used in spam classification, 
whereas the RF classifier is not commonly used 
(Blanzieri & Bryl, 2008). We perform a standard grid 
search with 10-fold cross validation to determine the best 
parameters for each classifier. 
We measure the performance of the classifier using the 
average precision score, also known as the area under the 
precision-recall curve (AUC-PR), and the accuracy 
(ACC). The AUC-PR scores give a probability that a 
randomly selected email with malicious content is 
correctly labelled by our classifier. The ACC scores give 
the percentage of spam emails that are correctly classified 
as containing malicious content or not. These measures 
are defined from four different scenarios from spam  
Type Attachments URLs 
Data Set Habul Botnet Habul Botnet 
Month Feature Score Feature Score Feature Score Feature Score 
Nov 
S05-CW 0.1115 S21-BZ2 0.1066 U02-NURLS 0.0875 H01-DAY 0.0628 
S23-SCL 0.0812 S20-ZLIB 0.0860 U01-UURLS 0.0719 P01-LEN 0.0562 
S09-LNW 0.0741 S17-CD 0.0722 P09-LNW 0.0530 P23-SCL 0.0536 
S15-DA 0.0665 S19-LZW 0.0581 P21-BZ2 0.0508 H03-MIN 0.0531 
H02-HOUR 0.0628 S22-CL 0.0451 P08-LW 0.0406 H02-HOUR 0.0476 
Table 4: Top 5 features determined by Random Forest classifier. Scores are the information entropy of features. 
Dec May Jan Feb Mar Apr Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov 
Data Split: July (Jul) 
Training Data Testing Data 
Data Split: November (Nov) 
Training Data Testing Data 
Figure 2: Illustration of splitting data into training and 
testing sets. 
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Figure 3: Comparison of Accuracy (ACC) scores for three classifiers 
Naïve Bayes (NB), Random Forest (RF) and Support Vector Machine (SVM) 
Figure 4: Comparison of AUC-PR scores for three classifiers 
Naïve Bayes (NB), Random Forest (RF) and Support Vector Machine (SVM) 
emails with attachments or URLs: true positive (TP), 
emails correctly classified as containing malicious 
attachments or URLs; true negative (TN), emails 
correctly classified as non-malicious; false positive (FP), 
emails incorrectly classified as malicious; and false 
negative (FN), emails incorrectly classified as non-
malicious. From these definitions, we have the positive 
precision value (precision) as 𝑃𝑃𝑉 =
𝑇𝑃
𝑇𝑃+𝐹𝑃
, and the true 
positive rate (recall) as 𝑇𝑃𝑅 =
𝑇𝑃
𝑇𝑃+𝐹𝑁
. By plotting PPV 
against TPR with instances of positive and negative 
values, we obtain a precision-recall (PR) curve, and 
calculate its area. We calculate the accuracy as: 𝐴𝐶𝐶 =
𝑇𝑃+𝑇𝑁
𝑇𝑃+𝐹𝑁+𝐹𝑃+𝑇𝑁
.  
As we are the first (as far as we are aware) to predict 
malicious content in emails. Thus, there are no 
comparable baseline measures available. In future work, 
we plan to expand our set of URL features and compare 
to related work of predicting phishing URLs in emails. 
For now, we present our classification results and discuss 
our findings in this initial work. 
7 Classification Results 
We compare the classification results for the three 
classifiers in Figure 4 for AUC-PR scores and in Figure 3 
for ACC scores. In Figure 5, we compare our 
classification results for the SVM classifier. We compare 
the data splits in each figure for two different data sets 
and three different classifiers. Our figures also show the 
effect of accumulating spam data each month for 
predicting malicious emails in the subsequent months. 
For emails with attachments, predicting whether 
attachments are malicious is highly successful on the 
Botnet data set, reaching a peak AUC-PR score of 0.9261 
(Figure 4 (a) and (c)). The low AUC-PR score for 
training set split in Jan is expected as we have insufficient 
data to learn whether attachments are malicious in the 
subsequent months (Feb to Dec). The classifier shows 
very poor performance on the Habul data set for many 
data splits (Figure 4 (a)). The reason is clear from Table 
1, where we see very few emails with attachments for the 
classifier to learn from. In some months corresponding 
with the data splits (e.g. Aug), we do not have any or few 
emails with malicious attachments. The low AUC-PR 
(Figure 4 (a) and (c)) and high ACC scores (Figure 3 (a) 
and (c)) suggests many false negatives as emails with 
malicious content are not classified correctly. However, 
for the data split of Nov, where we have the more training 
data compared to the testing data, the three classifiers 
perform well with AUC-PR scores for both data sets 
above 0.8 (Figure 4 (c)). The classifier performs well for 
the Botnet data set for attachments as we have many 
training samples for each month as seen in Table 2. 
For emails with URLs, all three classifiers show poor 
performance with AUC-PR scores (Figure 4 (b) and (d)) 
around or below 0.5. This means for an email with 
malicious URLs, the classifiers NB and SVM will label 
them correctly less than 50% of the time, worse than a 
random guess. However, we have very high accuracy 
scores for the classifiers RF and SVM in both data sets 
(Figure 3 (b) and (d)) for most data splits. The low AUC-
PR scores and high ACC scores show the classifiers 
(b) (a) 
(c) (d) 
Figure 5: Comparison of RF classification scores across different data sets. 
cannot distinguish emails with malicious URLs from 
emails with no malicious URLs. The reason for the poor 
performance of the classifier is the overwhelming number 
of emails with no malicious URLs. Our proposed features 
are insufficient to distinguish malicious URLs as they are 
underrepresented in the data set, as seen in Tables 1 and 
2. This means we cannot determine malicious URLs only 
from the text of emails with URLs. 
In Figure 5, we compare the classification results 
between our two data sets for the most robust classifier: 
Random Forest (RF). As discussed above, the 
comparatively numerous training samples in the Botnet 
data set allow high classification performance for both 
AUC-PR and ACC scores. The data split of Nov with the 
most training samples show high classification scores, 
especially in the Habul data set, where there fewer data 
samples. Figure 5 shows the Botnet data set is generally 
better for predicting malicious content in emails.  
Overall, our initial work shows the viability of 
predicting whether attachments and URLs in emails are 
malicious. Our proposed feature-rich model shows our 
hypothesis is true for malicious attachments as those 
emails can be predicted from the email subject and 
payload with high AUC-PR and ACC scores. For URLs, 
the subject and payload of emails do not indicate 
malicious URLs. In future work, we look to add more 
features for URLs, focusing on the lexical content (as in 
related work) to avoid requiring external resources, such 
as blacklists. Our initial success with predicting malicious 
attachments reduces the need to scan attachments for 
malicious content. When the data set is numerous, we can 
reduce the need to scan over 95% of emails with 
attachments (from AUC-PR scores) by analysing the text 
in emails with attachments. 
8 Discussion 
Our initial results are encouraging as they suggest we 
may be able to correctly identify over 95% of the 6 
billion emails with malicious attachments sent everyday 
(see Section 1) by analysing only the email subject and 
text content. While our success is not as high with 
identifying malicious URLs, our results show a manually 
labelled data set of spam emails with malicious URLs 
(Habul) can outperform (see Figure 4 (b) and (d))  an 
automated collection of spam emails with malicious 
URLs (Botnet). Our results reduce the need to scan large 
quantities of emails for malicious content 
The main advantage of our approach is the self-
contained sets of features extracted from only the email 
itself, without needing external resources such as virus 
scanners or blacklists. This means our machine learning 
algorithms can quickly adapt to changes in spam emails 
and later verify its results when scanners and blacklists 
have been updated. 
A limitation of our approach is the descriptiveness of 
our proposed sets of features. Our results show that the 
features are more suitable for predicting malicious 
attachments than malicious URLs. This suggests emails 
with malicious URLs do not have sufficient 
commonalities in the subject or text content to suggest the 
malicious intent of its URLs. Some exploit kits such as 
the Blackhole Exploit Kit simply inserts malicious URLs 
into emails without changing their content (Oliver, et al., 
2012). Thus, non-malicious spam emails can become 
malicious without any changes to their original spam 
content. To resolve this limitation, in future work we 
intend to add lexical features from related work (see 
Section 2.3) and propose our own for URLs, and compare 
their classification performance. 
Another limitation is the possibility of a few spam 
campaigns being overrepresented in our data sets. We 
have not performed a detailed spam campaign analysis as 
it is another research area beyond the scope of this paper. 
Reviewing statistics from Tables 1 and 2, for the Habul 
data set, we find 13 unique malicious attachments (in 19 
emails with malicious attachments), and 70 unique 
malicious URLs (in 78 emails with malicious URLs); and 
for the Botnet data set, we find 847 unique malicious 
attachments (in 3,008 emails with malicious attachments), 
and 889 unique malicious URLs (in 1,647 emails with 
malicious URLs). If each unique attachment or URL 
represented one spam campaign (thus having similar 
features in campaign emails), then the diversity of these 
spam campaigns are high, which strengthens our results 
as the classifiers can recognise a wide variety of spam 
campaigns with high AUC-PR and ACC scores for 
malicious attachments. In future work, we look to address 
this issue more closely by performing spam campaign 
analysis to see their influence on classification results. 
Overall, we confirm a part of our hypothesis that 
emails with malicious attachments can be predicted from 
only the email text features. Our evaluation on two real-
world data sets composing of only spam emails, show the 
effects of data set size, cumulative learning of spam 
emails over a year, and importance of features for 
classification. As this work in identifying one of the most 
dangerous type of spam email continues, we aim to 
prevent one avenue of cybercrime to expand by limiting 
exposure of malware to potential victims. 
9 Conclusion 
We presented rich descriptive sets of text features for the 
task of identifying emails with malicious attachments and 
URLs. We use two real-world data sets of spam emails, 
sourced from a manually labelled corpus (Habul) and 
automated collection from spamtraps (Botnet). Our initial 
results show that emails with malicious attachments can 
be predicted using text features extracted only from 
emails, without requiring external resources. However, 
this is not the case with emails with malicious URLs as 
their text features do not differ much from emails with 
URLs. We compare classification performance for three 
classifiers: Naïve Bayes, Random Forest, and Support 
Vector Machine. We compare the performance of 
features across our two data sets with the generally best 
performing Random Forest classifier. We discuss the 
effects of differences in data set sizes, potential 
overrepresentation of spam campaign emails, and 
advantages and limitations of our approach. Our initial 
success suggests we may be able to correctly identify 
over 95% of emails with malicious attachments without 
needing to scan the attachments. This is a huge saving in 
resources and prevention of cybercrime, as estimates 
show approximately 6 billion emails with malicious 
attachments are sent every day. 
In future work, we look to add features to improve the 
classification of emails with malicious URLs. We intend 
to extract more features from the header of emails, such 
as graph relationships of common (anonymised) email 
addresses. One important issue for our work is the effects 
of spam campaigns on classification results, which has 
not been addressed in related work. We plan a 
comprehensive analysis methodology with feature 
combinations, and balancing for data set sizes and spam 
campaigns. We plan to extend our work to prominent 
email data sets, such as the Enron email data set. 
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